Rethinking Sweden’s Arctic Reluctance

The Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) represents the people of Sweden. The parliamentary building, inaugurated in 1905, is located on Helgeandsholmen in central Stockholm. Photo: Ulf Grünbaum

The Arctic region has had its more than fair share of news headline in the recent past. Yet amid this renewed attention, Sweden has been largely, especially in comparison to other Arctic states, silent on developments in the region. While Stockholm has voiced its opposition to any unilateral US decision on the future of Greenland¹⁾Radio Sweden (2025) Kristersson on Trump comments: Only Denmark and Greenland decide. Available from https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/kristersson-on-trump-rhetoric-only-denmark-and-greenland-decide. Accessed on 15 July 2025 and Russia’s aggressive posturing,²⁾BBC News (2025) Sweden says Russia is greatest threat to its security. Available from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c89y8gn2w8vo. Accessed on 16 July 2025 more specifically, it has refrained from framing those statement as Arctic issues. This presents an intriguing paradox: despite its geographical presence, and growing material stakes, in the region, Sweden has traditionally tended to downplay the Arctic in its foreign and defence policy discourses prompting analysts and observers to label it as the “reluctant” Arctic state.³⁾Sörlin, S (2014) The reluctant Arctic citizen: Sweden and the North in Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes, ed (2014) Powell, R, C and Dodds, K. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar

This apparent downgrading of the Arctic in strategic and policy communications, however, maybe better understood as a deliberate act of policy making in a small country that enjoys the Finnish buffer against the largest Arctic state, and its main security threat, – Russia – and also happens to bare not one but multiple identities; Sweden is Nordic, Baltic, Arctic and European all at once. It is, so the argument goes, the combination of this ideational multiplicity and geographical convenience that enables decision makers in Stockholm to deliberately downplay the importance and/or centrality of the Arctic in their policy deliberations. Put differently, it is plausible that Sweden’s apparent Arctic reticence is less a symptom of disengagement and more a deliberate strategic decision aimed at maximising influence without attracting undue attention. Far from passive, and based on the available evidence, Sweden is actively positioning itself as a central actor in the evolving Arctic-Baltic nexus by embedding itself in the infrastructural systems that underpin regional security, communication, and European autonomy.

In tracing these developments across two key trends – the securitisation of undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and the digitalisation of the Arctic – this article reveals how Sweden is leveraging its multiple identities to exert infrastructural power. Sweden is not stepping away from the Arctic. Rather, it is redefining what it means to be present there. And in doing so, it is, arguably unintentionally, putting on a master class for none regional stakeholders on how to gain, expand, and legitimise their presence in the Arctic.

Sweden, Surveillance, and the Seabed: The Arctic and The Baltic as a Strategic Frontline

Much like the Arctic, the Baltic Sea region has re-emerged as a highly contested and increasingly surveilled theatre. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 catalysed a broad strategic awakening among European states concerning the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure to sabotage and surveillance. From the Nord Stream explosion in 2022⁴⁾Majkut, J, Palti-Guzman, L, Bergmann, M, Wall, C, and Dawes, A (2022) Security Implications of Nord Stream Sabotage. Available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-implications-nord-stream-sabotage. Accessed on 17 July 2025 to the Balticconnector gas pipeline incident⁵⁾The Guardian (2023) Finland recovers ship’s anchor close to damaged Baltic Sea pipeline. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/24/finland-recovers-ships-anchor-close-to-damaged-baltic-sea-pipeline. Accessed on 17 July 2025 and the mysterious damage to Sweden-Lithuania data cables in 2024,⁶⁾Moss, S (2024) Lithuania-Sweden subsea cable cut, was 10m from severed Finnish-German cable. Available from https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/lithuania-sweden-subsea-cable-cut-was-10m-from-severed-finnish-german-cable/. Accessed on 17 July 2025 the Baltic seabed has become a theatre of hybrid confrontation. Amid this growing volatility, Sweden is carving out a central, if understated, role for itself by subtly expanding its footprint in NATO’s and EU’s Baltic strategy as a traditional power broker in the Baltic and a key player in safeguarding of undersea infrastructures.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Sweden’s central involvement in NATO’s evolving posture on undersea defence. The city of Karlskrona is fast becoming a node in NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network (CUIN) hosting the first CUIN conference held outside Brussels in May.⁷⁾Kustbevakningen (2025) Lyckad konferens om undervattensinfrastruktur inom Nato. Available from https://www.kustbevakningen.se/nyheter/lyckad-konferens-om-undervattensinfrastruktur-inom-nato/. Accessed on 18 July 2025 This move reflects Sweden’s emerging function as the operational ‘contact point’ for NATO in the region and underscores the country’s ambition to integrate its Coast Guard and Maritime Administration into broader alliance efforts to detect, deter, and respond to threats beneath the surface.

However, a key component of this emerging role in the Baltic has an important Arctic nod; Sweden’s space resources in Kiruna⁸⁾Khorrami, N (2024) Bridging NATO and the EU: Sweden’s Strategic Role in Space. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/bridging-nato-eu-swedens-strategic-role-space/. Accessed on 18 July 2025 and the country’s leading role in increased resilience not just through increased undersea surveillance but through alternative space data transmission as well as alternative arctic undersea cable route.

At the heart of former is HEIST: a cutting-edge, Swedish-led initiative aimed at countering the unique vulnerabilities of submarine communication cables (SCC).⁹⁾HEIST – A NATO SPS Project. Available from https://natoheist.org/Home.html. Accessed on 1 September 2025 In an era when satellite jamming and cable sabotage can paralyse communications in the opening phase of conflict, HEIST aims to reduce SCC downtime from days to hours by fusing terrestrial, maritime, and space-based data streams. In practical terms, this translates into real-time rerouting of communication flows and unprecedented redundancy across digital infrastructure. Unlike traditional cable protection mechanisms, in other words, HEIST aspires to provide integrated and continuous surveillance by utilising resources across all domains.

With regard to the latter, there is a clearcut thread between Stockholm’s attempt to take the lead on the protection of undersea assets in the Baltic and its prioritisation of digital connectivity and undersea cables in the Arctic as an alternative data route between Europe and Asia.¹⁰⁾Oja, S (2024) Sweden Invests in Arctic and Polar Research: New Opportunities for Collaboration and Societal Impact. Available from https://www.umu.se/en/news/sweden-invests-in-arctic-and-polar-research_12021317. Accessed on 18 July 2025 This ambition is most visible in Sweden’s leadership within Polar Connect: an initiative to construct an Arctic submarine cable linking Europe and Asia via the North Pole.¹¹⁾Swedish Polar Research Secretariat. Polar Connect. Available from https://www.polar.se/projekt/polar-connect/. Accessed on 1 September 2025 The cable’s strategic rationale is manifold including reducing latency between continents and providing much-needed redundancy to a global system increasingly vulnerable to sabotage and systemic shocks. The June 2025 high-level meeting aboard the Swedish icebreaker Oden,¹²⁾Swedish Polar Research Secretariat (2025) High-level meeting on Oden focused on Sweden’s future in the Arctic. Available from https://www.polar.se/en/news/2025/high-level-meeting-on-oden-focused-on-swedens-future-in-the-arctic/. Accessed on 18 July 2025 underscored the national stakes. At the heart of this agenda lies the proposed construction of a new-generation Arctic icebreaker capable of sustaining cable-laying and research missions in extreme polar conditions.

This dual-use functionality, combining scientific, civilian, and strategic aims, in conjuncture with Finland’s expertise in building icebreakers,¹³⁾ Moyer, J, C and Lindholm, R (2024) Icebreaking Explained – Finland: Europe’s Icebreaker Superpower. Available from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/icebreaking-explained-finland-europes-icebreaker-superpower. Accessed on 18 July 2025 in turn, reflects two noteworthy trends. First, the two none littoral Arctic states are set to play a commanding role in the region’s maritime domain. More importantly, secondly, it indicates that source of legitimacy as an arctic stakeholder is not confined to territory only. Rather, legitimacy, and influence, could also be derived from infrastructure and the ability to service (digital) demand under hostile conditions. Sweden’s, and the EU’s, role here is catalytic. As global attention focuses on the fragility of submarine cables¹⁴⁾Wall, C and Morcos, P (2021) Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security. Available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security. Accessed on 18 July 2025 the Arctic’s cool climate, relative political stability, and vast distances from global chokepoints offer an attractive alternative.¹⁵⁾Delaunay, M (2025) Enabling Trans-Arctic Fibre Optic Cables in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape. Available from https://static1.squarespace.com/static/652166b84622250fce627581/t/686ced481adcf24ff1e55a3a/1751969099300/Enabling+Trans-Arctic+Fibre+Optic+Cables+in+a+Changing+Geopolitical+Landscape.pdf. Accessed on 18 July 2025 Yet the very qualities that make the region attractive also raise barriers: the costs of Arctic cable-laying are among the highest in the world which is why nearly all Arctic connectivity projects depend on public financing and long-term political commitment;¹⁶⁾Delaunay, M (2025) Enabling Trans-Arctic Fibre Optic Cables in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape. Available from https://static1.squarespace.com/static/652166b84622250fce627581/t/686ced481adcf24ff1e55a3a/1751969099300/Enabling+Trans-Arctic+Fibre+Optic+Cables+in+a+Changing+Geopolitical+Landscape.pdf. Accessed on 18 July 2025 precisely what Sweden and the EU are now cultivating.¹⁷⁾The Swedish Research Council (2024) EU funding for the Swedish project Polar Connect Available from https://www.vr.se/english/just-now/news/news-archive/2024-01-12-eu-funding-for-the-swedish-project-polar-connect.html. Accessed on 17 July 2025

This Arctic thrust coincides with yet another tectonic shift: the emerging migration of data centre infrastructure to the Nordic region.¹⁸⁾Skidmore, Z (2025) Nordics and southern Europe to see 110% data center demand growth by 2030 – report. Available from https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/nordics-and-southern-europe-to-see-110-data-center-demand-growth-by-2030-report/. Accessed on 15 July 2025 Energy efficiency, stable grids, political stability, and climate suitability have made the Nordics a magnet for hyperscalers. Companies like Microsoft are already redirecting investment away from traditional hubs like Ireland and toward Sweden and its neighbours, where access to renewable energy and land is more secure.¹⁹⁾Skidmore, Z (2025) Microsoft shifting data center focus away from Ireland due to lack of power availability – report. Available from https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/microsoft-shifting-data-center-focus-away-from-ireland-due-to-lack-of-power-availability-report/. Accessed on 15 July 2025 However, physical infrastructure is only one piece of the puzzle. Connectivity is the invisible backbone, and this is where Sweden’s contributions, through Polar Connect and also through Baltic surveillance and submarine cable protection, take on outsized relevance.

Lastly, the recent launch of BIFROST,²⁰⁾Space News (2025) Space Inventor Launches First Danish Arctic Satellite. Available from https://spacenews.com/space-inventor-launches-first-danish-arctic-satellite/. Accessed on 18 July 2025 a Danish-Swedish surveillance satellite designed to enhance Arctic monitoring, marks another crucial step in Sweden’s transformation into a regional “sensor state.” Developed in partnership with Denmark’s Defence Ministry and supported by Sweden’s Defence Materiel Administration, BIFROST will support sovereignty enforcement, ice navigation, and search and rescue operations across the High North. BIFROST, if combined with HEIST’s data-fusion capabilities and Polar Connect’s prospective cable backbone, enables a comprehensive multi-domain surveillance architecture: seabed, surface, and space.

What unites these seemingly disparate initiatives – icebreaker diplomacy, Arctic satellite monitoring, and digital infrastructure development – is Sweden’s subtle but strategic repositioning in the digital spaces of both the Arctic and the Baltic. Its silence in policy statements conceals a far more active presence in the Arctic reality. By leading in satellite surveillance, cable infrastructure, and icebreaking capabilities, Sweden is anchoring itself as the invisible core of the digital future of both regions.

Eyes and Ears of the High North

In an increasingly fragmented and contested regional order, Sweden appears to have opted for a posture that privileges function over form, capability over symbolism, and infrastructural presence over rhetorical assertions. By embedding itself into the critical systems and networks that underpin regional security and digital autonomy, it is becoming the eye and ear of the Arctic-Baltic nexus dominating the physical, digital, and informational infrastructures that allow others to both monitor and communicate in an era of hybrid threats.

What is more, this leadership is now taking tangible form across several domains. For instance, being home to Evroc, a sovereign European cloud platform,²¹⁾Butler, G (2025) Sovereign European cloud Evroc launches. Available from https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/sovereign-european-cloud-evroc-launches/. Accessed on 18 July 2025 positions Sweden at the heart of the EU’s drive for digital autonomy. Just as Sweden is helping Europe to see beneath the seabed and sense from orbit, it is now offering the tools to ‘think’ and store independently of foreign platforms. Equally significant, this informational power extends below the surface in other ways too. For one, Sweden’s prominence in Arctic mining,²²⁾Mining Technology (2020) Kiruna Iron Ore Mine, Sweden. Available from https://www.mining-technology.com/projects/kiruna/. Accessed on 18 July 2025 home to the world’s largest underground mine and a linchpin of Europe’s mineral supply chain, positions it as a key node in the unfolding politics of strategic resource sovereignty.

It follows then that Sweden’s downplaying of its Arctic identity could perhaps be better understood as a conscious act of strategic differentiation. Framed within its broader Nordic, Baltic, and European roles, this identity configuration enables Sweden to sidestep the high-stakes symbolism of Arctic exceptionalism while maximising its practical relevance to allies and partners. It allows Sweden to invest in the Arctic and near-Arctic domains without becoming beholden to Arctic geopolitics. It also enables Stockholm to differentiate itself from its neighbours. In other words, this approach provides Sweden with both room to manoeuvre and leverage to lead and at the same time maintain its much coveted sense of exceptionalism.²³⁾Dahl, A, S (2006) Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?, International Journal, 61(4): 895-908

However, As Sweden becomes a geopolitical hinge essential for strengthening European autonomy, it could also become increasingly exposed to new forms of risk. Foreign interference, the possibility of sabotage, and the prospect of economic coercion all rise in proportion to Sweden’s growing strategic relevance. This is the paradox at the heart of Sweden’s evolving role: the more it does to secure itself and the European digital and material sovereignty, the more it exposes itself to the vulnerabilities inherent in becoming pivotal.

By embedding itself into the hardwiring of regional and global systems ranging from seabed to cloud, Sweden is being transformed from a semi-peripheral actor into an indispensable one. Seen this way, Sweden’s relative silence on Arctic matters in its foreign and defence policy is more likely an instrument of strategy rather than an oversight; a strategy that is also reflective of a country with a great sense of exceptionalism and multiple identities Ultimately, to understand Sweden’s Arctic role is to look beyond maps and statements and toward systems and sensors. Sweden is building the platforms upon which Arctic and Baltic security, communication, and prosperity increasingly rest. In becoming the eyes and ears of the Arctic and the Baltic, it is also, and perhaps unconsciously, redefining what it means to be an Arctic actor; not by asserting its place on the map but by owning the networks that make the map legible. And herein lies a valuable lesson for all the outside actors keen on legitimising their desire for an increased presence in the Arctic.

Nima Khorrami is a Research Associate at The Arctic Institute.